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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
BR1TCE T. WORTHEN,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-~V:-5.-

SHURTLEFF AND ANDREvVS,
INC., a corporation,
Defendant,
-vs.-

THE DEPARTMENT OF
FINANCE, Successor of THE
COMMISSION OF FIN AN CE,
Administrator of THE STATE
INSURANCE FUND,
Intervener and Appellant.

Case
No.10651

Brief of Intervener and Appellant
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action against the Department of Fi11m1ce as Administrator of the State Insurance Fund
for a claim of attorney's fees by plaintiff-respondent's
attorney in securing a settlement against defendant.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Pursuant to Rule 67, URCP, the defendant depociited in Court a check in the amount of $60,000.00
1

and subsequent thereto the appellant was <lirectrd tu
appear and show eause why twenty-fi,'e percent of it~
rla.im should be paid to plaintiff-respondent's counsei.
The Court ruled in plaintiff-respondent's favor and iiitervenor appeals.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Intervener seeks reversal of the judgment arnl a
determination that it is entitled to full reimbursement.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff, Bruce T. Worthen, was on December
2, 1964, employed by H.F. Lowder Milk Company. While
in the course and scope of his employment, he suffcrr(l
personal injuries. The Utah State Insurance Fund was
the compensation carrier for H. F. Lowder ~filk Company and pursuant to its policy of insurance paid to the
injured plaintiff disability and medical expenses in the
sum of $10,667.44 as Workmen's Compensation Benefits. (R. 10, 11 and 12) The plaintiff through his attorney, Edward M. Garrett, sued the defendant, Shurtleff
and Andrews, Inc., for damages and prior to judgment
the case was settled by the defendant through its liability insurance <'arrier, The Hartford Insurance Group,
for $60,000.00 in full settlement of all claims of plaintiff
for injuries received in the above mentioned accident.
Pursuant to said settlement a draft was depm;ited with
the Clerk of Salt Lake County made payable as follows:
''Clerk of District Court of Salt Lake Com1t)' for
use and benefit of Bruce T. Worthen and Carol
2

Worthen and State Insurance Fund and Edward
M. Garrett, their attorney." (R. 10, 11 and 12)
Suhsequent to the deposit of said draft, and after
full sPttlement of the claim of the plaintiff-respondent
agaillst the defendant, the intervener was ordered to
~how cause why twenty-five percent of its claim of
$10,(ifi7.44 as Workmen's Compensation Benefits; viz.
$2,954.34 for medical expenses and $7,712.10 as compensation benefits, should not be deducted and paid to
plnintiff-respondent 's counsel, Edward M. Garrett as
fee for recovery of said amount. (R. 3, 4 and 5) On
the 25th day of ~fay, 1966, a Stipulation was entered into
by the parties and the Court ruled that Edward M. Garrett was entitled to attorney's fees of $2,666.86 which
was to be deducted from the State Insurance Fund's
claim in the amount of $10,667.44. (R. 9)

It was agreed that plaintiff-respondent employed
Edward M. Garrett for the prosecution of his action
aigainst the defendant, Shurtleff and Andrews, Inc.,
and agreed to pay for his services a contingent fee
equal to twenty-five percent of the amount recovered
from said defendant and further that said fee is reasonable for the services rendered. It was further stipulated
that only $10,667.44 would remain on deposit with th<.>
Clerk of the Court subject to a final determination and
declaration of the interest of the parties named in the
draft from The Hartford Insurance Group.
The State Insurance Fund had notice of the penclency of the law suit between plaintiff-respondent Worth3

en and defendant, Shurtleff and Andrews, Inc., and
further knew that Edward M. Garrett was represrllting
the plaintiff in this law suit. However, Attorney Oar.
rett did not have a contract of employment nor <lid ]ip
request permission to represent the State Insunm·1,
Fund. The Department of Finance was not a party to
the law suit and first received notice of Garrett's elaim
to attorney's fees after the settlement had been made.
ARGUMENT
The issue presented in this case is the construction
of Section 35-1-62, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which
provides, in part, as follows:
"If any recovery is obtained against such tl1ir<l
person it shall be disbursed as follows:
(1) The reasonable expense of the action, in-

cluding attorney's foes, shall be pai<l and
charged proportionately against tlie 1iarties as their interests may appear.

(2) The person liable for compensation payments shall be reimbursed in full for all

payments made.

(3) The balance shall be paid to the injured
employee or his heirs in case of death, to
be applied to reduce or satisfy in full any
obligation thereafter accruing against the
person liable for compensation." (Emphasis added)
This statute was construed, concerning the iclrntical
facts in this case, in McConnell v. Commission of Finance, 13 Utah 2nd 395, 375 P2d 394. This Court held
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that the State Insurance Fund is entitled to full reimhnrsement for all compensation benefits paid to the
plaintiff. The question in that case, as in this case, is
'"hether or not, under the circumstances, the State Insuranre Fund's share of the recovery should be reduced by
a proportionate share of the attorney's fees incurred in
the action brought by the injured employee. In this case
and in the McConnell case, the plaintiff, while in the course
arnl scope of his employment, suffered personal injuries
h~r a third party tortfeasor. The State Insurance Fund,
as compensation carrier for the plaintiff's employer,
paid medical and other compensation benefits to the
plaintiff. Thereafter the employee, through his attorney, b1·ought an action against the third party tortfeasor.
The attorneys in hoth cases prosecuted the matter on a
contingency basis of one-fourth of the recovery. Subsequent to settlement plaintiff's counsel seeked to recover
hack from the State Insurance Fund one-fourth of the
amount paid to the plaintiff's employee as attorney's fees.
:15-1-62, set out above, contemplates a three order
of priority of disbursement, that is: (1) Expenses of
t1ie action, including attorney's fees shall be paid against
the parties as their interest may appear; (2) Of any
snms remaining, the insurance carrier shall be reimbursed for compensation benefits in full; (3) The balance if any, should be paid to the injured employee or
his heirs.

This Court has held that when the State Insura11re Fund was not a party to the original action
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then it was not liable nor had it incurred a11y l<'gal P>:penses. Sub-section 2 of the statute requires that the
insurance carrier be reimbursed in full. Therefore, the
only reasonable construction that can he made is that il
the State Insurance Fund was not a party to the action
it must be reimbursed in full.

It is a.greed that the State Insurance Fund did not
employ Edward M. Garrett and in light of this Court',
past ruling was not requ~ired to in order to protect itR
interests in receiving full reimbursement. There is also
no doubt that the State Insurance Fund was not a party
to the original action and therefore attorney's feefl rannot be assessed against it under sub-section (1) of 35-1-fi2.
T~ough the differing statutes of sister states dealing with "Workmen's Compensation Laws is of different
wording and interpretation, it iR interesting to note that
in the problem of distribution of the proceeds of a third
party action that Utah follows the majority rule. 2 Larson Workman's Compensation Law (1961), Sec. 74.32:

"Usually attorneys' fees and expenses arc deducted both in priority to the employer's lien on
the employee's recovery, and before there is any
excess for the employee in the employer's reroYery. If the sum recovered by the employee is
more than enough to pay attorneys' fees and
reimburse the carrier, the carrier is reimbursed
in full, and is not required to share the leg-al expenses involved in obtaining the recovery. In
other words, under the usual provision, the legal
expenses diminish the over-all sum to which the
insurer's claim attaches; but if it is possible to
do so within that fund as diminished the insurer
is entitled to be reimbursed in full "' "' "'"
6

See also Tucker v. Nason (Iowa), 87 N.W. 2d 547;
Firemen's Fund Indemnity Co. v. Batts, (N.J.) 78 A.
2d 293.
It is therefore, the appellant's position that the

Lower Court's ruling allowing attorney's fees to Ed\\'ard M. Garrett was erroneous in light of the McConnell
decision and in light of the reasonable interpretation of
the statute. It is clear that the State Insurance Fund
------------------and it is
\ms not a party of this action/and the reimbursementalso clea
in full for all payments made by the State Insurancethat ther
Fund.
was
suf f icien
It is, therefore, submitted that Sec. 35-1-62 as applied recovery
.
to pay f o
to tllP facts of this case compels a reversal to the order the exentered and judgment should be entered in favor of thepenses of
Director of Finance as a matter of law.
the actio

CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully prays that the judgment enby the Lower Court be reversed and judgment be
entered in favor of the Director of Finance for $10,667.44
as reimbursement for all funds paid to the plaintiff by it.
terc~d

Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT D. MOORE
517 American Oil Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Intervener
and Appellant
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